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Summary
Conceptual representations are perceptually grounded, but when investigating which perceptual modalities are 
involved, researchers have typically restricted their consideration to vision, touch, hearing, taste, and smell. However, 
there is another major modality of perceptual information that is distinct from these traditional five senses; that is, 
interoception, or sensations inside the body. In this paper, we use megastudy data (modality-specific ratings of 
perceptual strength for over 32,000 words) to explore how interoceptive information contributes to the perceptual 
grounding of abstract and concrete concepts. We report how interoceptive strength captures a distinct form of 
perceptual experience across the abstract-concrete spectrum, but is markedly more important to abstract concepts 
(e.g., hungry, serenity) than to concrete concepts (e.g., capacity, rainy). In particular, interoception dominates 
emotion concepts, especially negative emotions relating to fear and sadness, moreso than other concepts of equivalent
abstractness and valence.  Finally, we examine whether interoceptive strength represents valuable information in 
conceptual content by investigating its role in concreteness effects in word recognition, and find that it enhances 
semantic facilitation over and above the traditional five sensory modalities.  Overall, these findings suggest that 
interoception has comparable status to other modalities in contributing to the perceptual grounding of abstract and 
concrete concepts. 
Introduction
Concepts are the basis of the human cognitive system, and the question of what constitutes the content of these mental
representations has long occupied the cognitive sciences. Work in recent decades has converged on the idea that we 
develop our conceptual representations through our perception of and interaction with our environment [e.g., 1, 2, 3]. 
That is, the conceptual system has co-opted the perceptual system for the purposes of representation.  To date, such 
research has typically restricted consideration to the perceptual modalities of vision, touch, hearing, and, to a lesser 
extent, taste and smell [e.g., 4, 5, 6]. However, there is another major modality of perceptual information that is 
distinct from these traditional five senses; that is, interoception, or sensations within the body. 
Interoception is a broad term that refers to perception internal to the body's surface, and incorporates sensations from 
the visceral organs (e.g., heart, lungs, stomach) along with autonomic, hormonal, and even immunological signals [7, 
8, 9, 10].  Sensations classed as interoception include cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, bladder, hunger, 
thirst, blood/serum (pH, osmolality, glucose level), temperature, vasomotor flush (i.e., hot flushes), air hunger (i.e., 
breathlessness), muscle tension, shudder, itch, tickle, pleasure, genital sensation, and sensual touch; as well as painful 
sensations such as inflammation, bone fracture, or headache.  The common role of these sensations is to help maintain
physiological homeostasis (i.e., the stable and efficient functioning of the body's dynamically interdependent parts). 
In addition, because emotional experience incorporates physiological and visceral changes, there has also been some 
speculation regarding how interoceptive sensations contribute to the processing of emotions [e.g., 7, 9, 11, 12].
With such an expansive list of associated sensations, it may seem that interoception is quite different from other 
perceptual modalities, but this is not necessarily the case. A broad range of sensations also exists within other 
1* Author for correspondence: Louise Connell (l.connell@lancaster.ac.uk).
1
modalities, such as vision (incorporating colour, pattern, movement, shape, spatial distance, etc.) and touch 
(incorporating pressure, texture, movement, vibration, tactile cold/heat, etc.).  The breadth of interoception does not 
mean that it cannot be considered as a coherent perceptual modality; rather, compared to the five classic modalities, 
we suggest that people are not generally accustomed to thinking of interoception as a single category of experience. 
The various aspects of interoceptive sensation can also be measured using similar methods to studies of sensory 
perception in the other modalities, such as attention (passive or active), detection, magnitude/intensity judgements, 
discrimination, accuracy/sensitivity, and qualitative self-report approaches [10].  For instance, while people are not 
always aware of interoceptive sensations from internal organs such as the heart, it is possible to attend consciously to 
these sensations and, indeed, heartbeat detection [13] or counting [14] is a classic task in the empirical investigation 
of interoceptive perception. In other words, like the traditional five modalities of vision, touch, hearing, taste, and 
smell, interoception is a physiologically distinct category of perceptual experience.
Current neural models describe interoception as a construct of the central nervous system, reflecting communication 
between the periphery (i.e., the body) and the brain in the maintenance of homeostasis [7, 9, 13]. For example, one 
influential view [7, 8] describes interoception as following an ascending pathway, starting at the receptor site, from 
where information is relayed via spinal or cranial nerves to the brainstem, sub-cortical structures (e.g. thalamic nuclei,
hypothalamus, amygdala) and ultimately to the cortex, in particular the insula and cingulate cortex (ACC), but also 
the inferior and medial frontal cortex, somatosensory and somatomotor cortex (see also [13]). Within this framework, 
a posterior-to-anterior progression of increasing representational complexity in the insula acts to integrate information
from different homeostatic pathways, sensory signals from the secondary somatosensory cortex, as well as 
information from the amygdala, hypothalamus, emotional activity in the ACC and orbitofrontal cortex, and 
‘contextual planning’ area of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  Thus, current neural models for interoception suggest 
that the insula is the critical cortical region for the formation of an integrated interoceptive representation.  Indeed, 
neuroimaging and lesion studies have shown that the dorsal posterior insula is active in pain, temperature, itch, 
dynamic or painful muscle sensation, sensual touch, hunger, thirst, gustation, cardiorespiratory activity and air hunger
(see [7] for a review); sensations all falling within the broad definition of interoception.  As such, like the traditional 
five modalities of vision, touch, hearing, taste, and smell, interoception is a cortically distinct category of perceptual 
experience.
Perceptual Grounding of Concepts
Modality-specific perceptual experience is important to how concepts are grounded.  For example, when reading the 
word cinnamon, olfactory processing areas of the brain also become activated even though there is no cinnamon scent
present [15]. That is,  the concept of cinnamon is perceptually grounded in the systems that process olfactory 
experience because representing the meaning of the word cinnamon involves re-activating of some of the neural areas
involved in perceptual experience of its referent. Many behavioural studies also highlight the importance of 
information from all five basic modalities in predicting performance across a range of conceptual tasks, including 
modality-switching cost paradigms [5, 16], word modality detection/categorisation [17], conceptual combination [18],
attentional blink [19], recognition memory [20], and word recognition [21, 22, 23, 24]. For instance, the strength of 
perceptual experience in the auditory modality is a reliable predictor of word naming times (i.e., reading aloud), a 
word recognition task where auditory monitoring of the speech stream ensures correct word production, but it does 
not predict lexical decision times, a word recognition task that uses silent reading [22].  
While the majority of the above empirical work has concentrated on concrete concepts, there is evidence that 
individual modalities of perceptual experience are important to abstract concepts as well.  Many words that are 
traditionally considered to be abstract, and therefore score low on concreteness and imageability ratings, nonetheless 
score highly on individual modalities of perceptual strength [21].  For example, despite being rated as abstract, fear is 
strongly visual, noisy is strongly auditory, and quality is strongly multimodal across all five modalities of touch, taste,
smell, sound, and vision.  Perceptual strength in the dominant modality is an important predictor of how easily words 
are recognised across the abstract-concrete spectrum [22, 23, 25], better than concreteness or imageability ratings 
[21].  That is, concepts such as fear or noisy are grounded in the perceptual modalities through which they are 
experienced, and the extent of experience in a particular modality can be used to successfully predict conceptual 
processing in a range of cognitive tasks.  The evidence to date therefore demonstrates that concepts rely on the five 
traditional perceptual modalities to provide a grounded basis to their representation, but it remains unknown to what 
extent grounding may also rely on interoceptive information.
Our goal in the present paper was to explore how interoception contributes to the perceptual grounding of concepts.  
Using a megastudy dataset of perceptual strength ratings in six modalities (auditory, gustatory, haptic, olfactory, 
visual, and interoceptive) for over 32,000 concepts [26], we ran a series of exploratory analyses to examine whether 
and how interoception plays a major role in experience of both abstract and concrete concepts.  In particular, since 
interoception has been linked to emotional experience, we explored whether interoceptive strength plays an especially
2
large role in the experience of emotions such as happiness, fear and love.  Finally, we examined whether interoceptive
strength contributes to perceptual grounding by assessing its role in semantic facilitation of word recognition. 
Study 1 – Interoception in Abstract and Concrete Concepts
Since all concepts are perceptual to some extent, even traditionally abstract ones like republic and theory [21, 27], it is
plausible that interoception may be important to both abstract and concrete concepts.  In our first study, we aimed to 





A total of 32,229 concepts were compiled for which perceptual strength norms existed on six individual perceptual 
modalities: hearing, taste, touch, interoception, smell, and vision. Most concepts were labelled with a single word (N 
= 29,887) but some concepts such as heart attack were labelled with a two-word lexicalised phrase (N = 2,342).  
These words represented the total sample of completed items available at the time of analysis from a norming 
megastudy [26] that aimed to collect ratings of perceptual and action strength for all English words that are known by 
85% of native speakers (i.e., some 40 thousand words [28]). In these norms, participants were asked to rate ‘‘to what 
extent do you experience WORD’’ through each of six sensory modalities (i.e., ‘‘by hearing’’, ‘‘by tasting’’, ‘‘by 
feeling through touch’’, “by sensations inside the body”, ‘‘by smelling’’, and ‘‘by seeing’’), using separate rating 
scales for each modality ranging from 0 (“not at all”) to 5 (“greatly”).  Inter-rater agreement was excellent for each 
modality (Cronbach's αs > .9).  This norming method had previously been used to establish modality-specific 
experiential strength in the traditional five modalities (i.e., excluding interoception) for comparatively modest 
samples of several hundred words [5, 24, 27], where the resulting norms successfully predicted a range of findings in 
word recognition [21, 22, 23, 25] and conceptual processing [5, 17].  Perceptual strength norms therefore comprised a
6-value vector per word of auditory, gustatory, haptic, interoceptive, olfactory, and visual strength, each ranging from 
0 (low strength) to 5 (high strength).
Design and Analysis
Data were analysed with two exploratory goals in mind: to determine the importance of interoceptive strength relative
to other perceptual modalities and across conceptual domains, and to examine whether and how interoceptive strength
and dominance differed between abstract and concrete concepts.  Since these analyses were exploratory rather than 
confirmatory, we report no inferential statistics.  All datasets and code for Studies 1-3 are available [29].
We categorised concepts as abstract or concrete using concreteness ratings on a 5-point scale [28], where abstract 
concepts were those rated between 1.00-2.99 (N = 17,129) and concrete concepts were those rated between 3.00-5.00 
(N = 15,100).  For more in-depth comparisons within degrees of concreteness, we further split these categories into 
very abstract (1.00-1.99), somewhat abstract (2.00-2.99), somewhat concrete (3.00-3.99), and very concrete (4.00-
5.00).  Following previous conventions for categorising concepts by perceptual strength [5], we also split by 
interoceptive strength into categories of weak (rating range 0.00-1.49), moderate (1.50-3.49), and strong (3.50-5.00)
 
Results and Discussion
Importance of Interoceptive Information
Inter-correlations of perceptual strength ratings show that interoceptive experience was relatively distinct from other 
modalities.  It was negatively related to visual (r = –.325) and haptic (r = –.078) strength, and positively related to 
auditory (r = .142), gustatory (r = .095), and olfactory (r = .042) strength.  In other words, that which can be sensed 
inside the body tends not to be visible or touchable, but can sometimes be heard, tasted, or smelled to some extent, 
although none of the relationships were particularly strong.  In order to quantify the distinctness of interoceptive 
information, we ran principal components analysis across all six modalities and examined how the extracted 
components incorporated each original variable.  Parallel analysis (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation of the 95th percentile 
of eigenvalues) determined that the optimal number of components to extract was two, explaining 58.9% of the 
original variance, and these components were then orthogonalised via varimax rotation.  Uniqueness scores (i.e., the 
proportion of variance from each variable that is not shared with the extracted components) showed that a little more 
than half of the information in interoceptive strength ratings was unique (52.2%), less than that of auditory strength 
(74.1%), but more than gustatory (19.1%), haptic (43.1%), olfactory (21.1%), or visual (36.8%) strength.
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Interoception dominated a sizeable number of concepts (i.e., interoceptive strength was the highest rating of all six 
modalities), some 8.6% in total.  In terms of relative importance, interoception dominated more concepts than taste, 
smell and touch combined, but fewer than hearing or vision (see Table 1); the pattern of dominance across the five 
traditional modalities was consistent with previous findings [5, 15].  Many interoceptively-dominant concepts related 
to the domains of sensation that are typically associated with interoception in the perceptual and neuroimaging 
literature, including cardiovascular (e.g., heart, heartbeat, bloodstream), pulmonary (e.g., breathing, asphyxiation, 
inhale), gastrointestinal (e.g., hunger, thirst, nausea), thermoregulatory (e.g., cool down, warmness, heatwave), 
genitourinary (e.g., orgasm, urination, ejaculate), and pain (e.g., painful, agony, bellyache) systems.  Other notable 
domains that were dominated by interoceptive perception included fatigue (e.g., tired, sleepy, wearily), pregnancy 
(e.g., fetus, contraction, gestational), illness and injury (e.g., diabetes, influenza, whiplash), drugs (e.,g., caffeine, 
heroin, amphetamine), and a wide variety of emotion concepts (e.g., anger, sadness, fear, joy, happy).  Without 
interoceptive strength, many of these interoceptively-dominant concepts would have been regarded as perceptually 
weak (i.e., when only the five traditional perceptual modalities were being considered).  For instance, adrenaline, 
jetlag and anxiously were strongly interoceptive (strength ratings > 4) but were very weak in all other modalities 
(ratings < 1).  
Overall, this pattern of findings suggests that interoceptive strength ratings capture distinctive information about 
perceptual experience that is not represented in the traditional five sensory modalities.  Moreover, this distinctive 
interoceptive information offers a potential means of grounding a wide variety of concept types that would otherwise 
have been misinterpreted as lacking perceptual information.
Interoception in Abstract and Concrete Concepts
Across a number of related measures, interoception was more strongly associated with abstract concepts than concrete
concepts.  Interoceptive strength was negatively correlated with concreteness ratings (r = –.397): that is, concepts 
which were strongly experienced via sensations inside the body tended to be regarded as abstract rather than concrete.
As previously observed [21], concreteness was also negatively correlated with auditory strength (r = –.223), and 
positively with visual (r = .562), haptic (r = .526), gustatory (r = .159), and olfactory (r = .257) strength.  Most 
notably, the magnitude of the relationship between interoception and concreteness was in the middle of the range, less
than that of sight and touch, but greater than that of sound, taste and smell.
Since concepts are commonly split dichotomously into abstract and concrete categories, typically at the midpoint of 
the concreteness scale, we examined interoceptive strength from this perspective.  As shown in Figure 1, interoceptive
strength ratings were markedly higher for abstract concepts (M = 1.34, SD = 0.89) than for concrete concepts (M = 
0.73, SD = 0.75).  All other modalities, with the exception of audition, followed the opposite direction whereby 
perceptual strength ratings were higher for concrete concepts than abstract.  However, it was possible that this 
apparent negative relationship between interoception and concreteness was an artifact of the particular concepts near 
the midpoint of the concreteness scale, where ratings tend to be noisier than ratings at the extremes because they often
reflect participant disagreement or confusion [30].  If this were the case, then unequivocally abstract concepts (i.e., 
those close to the extremely abstract end of the scale) may actually be experienced only weakly via interoception, 
whereas unequivocally concrete concepts may be interoceptively strong.  To explore this possibility, we used a more 
fine-grained breakdown of concreteness ratings into four categories from very abstract to very concrete, and 
examined concepts in three categories of interoceptive strength: weak, moderate, and strong (see Table 2).  Strongly 
interoceptive concepts occurred across the full range of the abstract-concrete scale and were nearly three times more 
numerous at the very abstract extreme (N = 146) than at the very concrete extreme (N = 46), while concepts with 
moderate interoceptive strength followed a similar but more pronounced pattern.  Conversely, interoceptively weak 
concepts were more numerous at the extremely concrete end of the scale than at the extremely abstract end.  This 
distribution of concepts suggests that midscale noise is not responsible for the relationship between interoceptive 
strength and concreteness ratings, and that abstract concepts are more likely than concrete concepts to rely on 
interoception. 
Finally, a greater proportion of abstract concepts (13.6%) than concrete concepts (3.0%) were dominated by 
interoception. Of the 2,781 concepts that were interoceptively dominant, the largest share were very abstract (N = 
1213, 43.6%) or somewhat abstract (N = 1109, 39.9%), whereas a much smaller number were very concrete (N = 103,
3.7%) or somewhat concrete (N = 356, 12.8%).  By contrast, of the 29,448 concepts dominated by modalities other 
than interoception, the smallest share were very abstract (N = 5313, 18.0%), a large number were somewhat abstract 
(N = 9494, 32.2%), but almost half were either somewhat concrete (N = 7261, 24.7%) or very concrete (N = 7380, 
25.1%).  Concrete concepts that were dominated by interoception tended to focus on physiological entities or 
effectors that could also be perceived outside the body, such as fatigue, pain and illness, gastrointestinal 
(mal)function, and drugs.  For instance, the five most concrete interoceptively-dominant concepts were valium, poop, 
pancreas, windpipe, and intestines, all of which had moderate interoceptive strength ratings.  Abstract concepts that 
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were dominated by interoception tended to come from a wider variety of domains that incorporated those of concrete 
concepts and additionally included concepts related to emotion and cognition.  For example, the five most abstract 
interoceptively-dominant words were spiritually, belief, enlightening, intuitively, ambivalent, all of which were 
moderately or strongly interoceptive.
In summary, interoceptive experience provides a potential means of grounding concepts across the full spectrum of 
concreteness, but appears to be more important to abstract concepts than to concrete concepts.  At least some of this 
difference emerges from the fact that emotion concepts, which are overwhelmingly abstract both in participant 
judgements and theoretical assumptions [e.g., 3, 28, 31, 32, 33], tend to be strongly reliant on interoception.  We 
examine the interoceptive nature of emotions in more depth in the next study.
Study 2 – Interoception in Emotion Concepts
A growing body of evidence [e.g., 9, 11, 14] points to a relationship between emotional and interoceptive experience, 
which suggests that interoception may be particularly important in the grounding of emotion concepts. Our second 
study therefore aimed to explore the importance of interoceptive experience to emotion concepts, including concepts 
belonging to different emotion categories.
Method
Materials
547 emotion concepts were compiled from the perceptual strength norms used in Study 1. Thirty-one prototypical 
emotion words [34] were initially selected as the core item set, and we then identified multiple associated lemmas for 
each root word (e.g., “sadden”, “sadly” and “sadness” for the root word “sad”) and additional related emotion 
concepts via a thesaurus. Any ambiguous words with a secondary meaning that related to a non-emotion concept 
(e.g., “irritation” can refer to a skin irritation as well as an emotional state) were excluded.
We also selected 547 non-emotional abstract concepts to act as matched controls (e.g., condemn, heaven), which were
matched individually to the emotion concepts on concreteness ratings [28] and predominant word class (i.e., verb, 
noun, adverb or adjective). Five emotion concepts fell just above the midpoint of the concreteness scale with ratings 
between 3.00-3.13 (e.g., rage), as did six control concepts (e.g., destroy), but as these items represent only 1% of the 
dataset we continue to refer to the items as abstract for convenience.  Concreteness ratings were on average 2.01 (SD 
= 0.33) for emotion concepts and 2.00 (SD = 0.33) for abstract control concepts. We also made a simultaneous effort 
to match on valence but ratings were available for only 240 emotion concepts [35], for which we selected a non-
emotion concept with a similar valence rating to act as a matched control (e.g., emotion concept angst matched with 
non-emotion control trickery). We estimated the valence of a further 234 emotion concepts from their lemmas (e.g., 
valence rating for anxiously based on that for anxious) and then selected non-emotion matched controls as above 
(e.g., incoherently).  We classified a final 73 concepts as positive or negative valence based on their core emotion 
category (i.e., anger, fear, disgust and sadness words were classed as negative; love, happiness and surprise words 
were classed as positive [34, 36]) and then selected a non-emotion matched control from the same valence class (e.g., 
perturbed was classified as negative valence so we selected non-emotion negative concept deceptive as a matched 
control).
Design and Analysis
We conducted exploratory analyses with two goals in mind: to determine the importance of interoception relative to 
other perceptual modalities in emotion concepts compared to abstract control concepts, and to examine whether and 
how the contribution of interoceptive information differed across emotion categories.  For the latter analysis, we 
categorised emotion concepts into subgroups of seven core categories: anger (N = 35), disgust (N = 33), fear (N = 57),
happiness (N = 66), love (N = 31), sadness (N = 62), and surprise (N = 21).  Not all emotion words could be 
unambiguously categorised in this way (e.g., envy does not belong to one of the above categories), and such words 
were excluded from the category analysis.  As in Study 1, these analyses were exploratory and no inferential statistics 
are reported. 
Results and Discussion
Interoception in Emotion versus Other Abstract Concepts
The majority of emotion concepts (64.0%, N = 350) were dominated by interoception, in contrast to a much smaller 
proportion of abstract control concepts (16.3%, N = 89).  The remainder of emotion concepts were dominated by 
vision (22.9%, N = 125) and audition (12.8%, N = 70), while these modalities predominated in abstract control 
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concepts (vision: 61.4%, N = 336; audition: 21.0%, N = 115). Less than 1% of all concepts from both groups were 
dominated by gustatory, haptic, or olfactory information.  For emotion concepts, mean interoceptive strength was 
higher than all other sensory modalities, and, indeed, was higher than interoceptive strength for abstract controls (see 
Figure 2). The magnitude of interoceptive strength for abstract control concepts in this study (M = 1.75, SD = 0.76) 
was higher than that found in Study 1 for all abstract concepts (M = 1.34, SD = 0.89), possibly due to controlling 
concreteness, valence and word class, but interoceptive strength for emotion concepts was markedly higher again (M 
= 2.90, SD = 0.81).  These data suggest that interoception is the most important perceptual modality in the experience 
of emotion concepts, and that emotions appear to rely on interoceptive information moreso than other, non-emotion 
abstract concepts. 
Interoception Across Emotion Categories
While interoception was at least moderately important to all categories of emotion, its importance varied across 
individual categories (see Figure 3).  Interoceptive strength was highest for fear, followed by sadness, happiness, 
love, anger, disgust, and surprise.  Examination of interoceptive dominance showed a slightly different pattern, where
interoception tended to be more important to negative categories of emotion than to positive categories.  The negative 
emotion categories most dominated by interoception were fear (86.0%, N = 49) and sadness (85.5%, N = 53), 
followed by a majority of concepts in disgust (54.5%, N = 18), and lastly anger (40.0%, N = 14).  On the positive 
side, most concepts in happiness were interoceptively dominant (65.2%, N = 43), but there was a smaller proportion 
for love (41.9%, N = 13) and surprise (38.1%, N = 8). Finding that interoception was extremely important for 
concepts relating to the emotions of fear and sadness is consistent with work linking interoception to depression [12], 
anxiety [14], and panic disorder [37].  Nonetheless, interoception was important to the experience of all core emotion 
categories, even where it did not dominate, which suggests that the description of emotions as “visceral” may be a 
literal truth.  That is, emotion concepts such as grieving, terror, and bliss, which are usually categorised as abstract, 
are largely experienced – and potentially grounded – through sensations inside the body.
Study 3 – Interoception and Concreteness Effects
Although Studies 1 and 2 showed that interoception is important to how people experience both abstract and concrete 
concepts, particularly (but not exclusively) emotions, how can we be certain that interoceptive information 
contributes to conceptual grounding?  It could be argued that the apparent importance of interoceptive strength is 
simply an artifact of having asked people to think explicitly about an unusual sensory modality, but that it does not 
normally play an important role in the grounded representation of concepts.  In this final study, we aimed to ascertain 
whether interoceptive information contributes to concreteness effects in word recognition, a phenomenon that results 
from automatic and implicit access to the grounded semantics of words.
Concreteness effects are a form of semantic facilitation whereby words that refer to concrete concepts are processed 
more quickly and accurately than those referring to abstract concepts [e.g., 38, 39].  Recently, we have shown that 
maximum perceptual strength (i.e., strength in the dominant modality) is the best available predictor of concreteness 
effects in word recognition, whereby strongly perceptual words are recognised more easily than weakly perceptual 
words [21, 23].  To date, maximum perceptual strength has been based only on the five traditional sensory modalities 
(i.e., hearing, sight, touch, taste, and smell), without incorporating interoception.  If interoceptive information is 
important to the grounding of conceptual content, then including it in the calculation of maximum perceptual strength 
will predict semantic facilitation better than basing dominance on the five traditional sensory modalities.  By contrast,
if interoceptive information does not play an important role in conceptual grounding, then its inclusion will make 
little difference to the ability of maximum perceptual strength to predict semantic facilitation in word recognition.
Method
Materials
We utilised data from the English Lexicon Project (Elexicon: [40]) to provide lexical decision and word naming 
response times (RT: standardized response times with individual variance removed) and accuracy (proportion correct 
responses) for each word.  Of our original 32,229 concepts, 19,041 had available data in Elexicon, split almost evenly
between abstract (N = 9518) and concrete (N = 9523) concepts, and with a similar proportion of interoceptively-
dominant concepts as the full dataset (9.0%).  We also extracted lexical characteristics from Elexicon to act as 
predictors, as described below.  
Design and Analysis
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For each dependent variable (RT and accuracy per lexical decision and word naming tasks), we ran Bayesian linear 
regression analyses with non-informative default priors (r scale covariates = .354 [41]) to determine whether the data 
were better modelled by including or excluding interoception from the calculation of maximum perceptual strength. 
Analyses comprised two hierarchical steps.  Step 1 determined a basic lexical model: rather than specify a 
compulsory set of lexical predictors for all analyses, we allowed the data to determine the most appropriate subset of 
lexical predictors for each dependent variable.  We entered candidate lexical predictors that commonly contribute to 
word recognition performance (log SUBTLEXus word frequency, length in letters, number of syllables, orthographic 
neighborhood size, phonological neighborhood size, orthographic Levenshtein distance, phonological Levenshtein 
distance) and calculated the Bayes Factor (BF10) for each subset relative to the best model. We then selected the best 
model to go forward to the next step where there was good evidence it was superior to the second-best model (BF10 
<= 0.333), or, where the best and second-best models were not clearly distinguishable (second-best model BF10 > 
0.333), we selected the model with fewer parameters.  Step 2 entered one of our two semantic predictors of interest: 
maximum perceptual strength across the five traditional modalities (i.e., highest rating of auditory, gustatory, haptic, 
olfactory, and visual strength), and maximum perceptual strength across six modalities including interoception (i.e., 
highest of the six modality-specific ratings). 
Due to the magnitude of the BF values, we report natural log BFs for the Step 2 model comparison of each maximum 
perceptual strength predictor relative to the null model of Step 1 (log BF10 for five traditional modalities; log BF20 for 
six modalities including interoception), and for the comparisons between the two competing Step 2 models of 
maximum perceptual strength across six modalities including interoception relative to five traditional modalities (log 
BF21). 
Results and Discussion
Maximum perceptual strength across the five traditional modalities was an excellent predictor of word recognition 
performance, but maximum perceptual strength including interoception outperformed it across all measures (Table 3).
For both RT and accuracy in both lexical decision and word naming, the data were log 15-37 times more likely when 
maximum perceptual strength incorporated interoception than when it excluded it.  These results constitute very 
strong evidence [42] that interoceptive strength improves the ability of maximum perceptual strength to predict 
concreteness effects in word recognition.  Interoceptive information therefore forms part of the semantic content that 
is automatically activated on presentation of a word, and its importance in Studies 1-2 is not a mere artifact of an 
explicit rating task.  In short, the present results indicate that interoception contributes to the perceptual grounding of 
concepts.
General Discussion
In a series of exploratory analyses on a megastudy dataset, we examined the role of interoception in the perceptual 
grounding of concepts.  In Study 1, we analysed over 32,000 concepts and found that interoceptive strength (i.e., the 
extent to which a concept is experienced through sensations inside the body) captures distinctive perceptual 
information that is important to a wide range of conceptual domains, including physiological functions (e.g., 
heartbeat, breathing, hunger, thirst, heatstroke, orgasm, pain, fatigue), illness (e.g., diabetes, flu), drugs (e.g., 
caffeine, heroin), cognition (e.g., belief, think), and emotion (e.g., fear, joy, love).  In particular, interoception is more 
important to abstract concepts than to concrete concepts, dominating 13.6% of abstract concepts compared to only 
3.0% of concrete concepts.  In Study 2, we investigated a subset of over 500 emotion concepts and found that 
interoception is the most important perceptual modality in the experience of emotions (moreso than other concepts of 
similar abstractness), particularly dominating those relating to fear and sadness.  Finally, in Study 3, we showed that 
interoception improved the ability of maximum perceptual strength (i.e., strength in the dominant perceptual 
modality) to predict concreteness effects in word recognition, a task where access to conceptual content is automatic 
and implicit, which indicates that interoception forms part of the perceptual information that comprises the referent 
concept. Taken together, our findings suggest that interoception has comparable status to other modalities in 
contributing to the perceptual grounding of concepts, particularly abstract concepts, and particularly emotion 
concepts. 
These findings raise the question of whether we should really be considering concepts like love, serenity, and thought 
as abstract when they have such a strong sensory component.  Contrary to conventional definitions of abstract 
concepts (i.e., that their referents are not particularly experienced via the senses: [e.g., 3, 28, 32]), we found that 
abstract concepts were more strongly interoceptive, and more likely to be dominated by interoceptive experience, than
concrete concepts.  For instance, the concepts of hopelessness, mood, vitality, and willpower are all extremely abstract
(ratings between 1-2 on a 1-5 concreteness scale) and yet are simultaneously very strongly experienced by sensations 
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inside the body (ratings between 4-5 on a 0-5 interoceptive strength scale).  It is similarly possible to identify other 
examples of very abstract concepts that are nonetheless strongly experienced by other modalities, including hearing 
(e.g., verbose) or vision (e.g., fashionable).  Clearly, abstract cannot mean non-perceptual.
One possible explanation for this conflict is that the abstract/concrete distinction does depend, at least in part, on how 
much a concept is grounded in perceptual experience, but that people have been hitherto mistaken as to which 
concepts are minimally experienced via the senses.  Recent research from our lab has shown that people are generally 
not very good at assessing their sensory experience of a concept without losing a large amount of perceptual 
information in the process [23].  Unless attention is explicitly drawn to each modality individually, participants 
instead tend to focus on visual (and to a lesser extent, olfactory) experience but neglect or distort information from 
auditory, haptic and gustatory modalities. We did not consider interoception in that study, but it is plausible that it too 
may be subject to such neglect or distortion.  The net effect is that, whenever people consider the abstract/concrete 
distinction on the basis of sensory experience, they most likely fail to consider all relevant sensory information, and 
so many strongly perceptual concepts end up erroneously categorised as abstract. If this explanation is correct, then 
concepts like love (indeed, emotion concepts in general), thought, and fashionable would not be abstract because they
are strongly perceptual.  Only concepts that are weak across all perceptual modalities, such as year, hydrogen, or 
plausibly, would be truly abstract.  However, such an explanation is not entirely consistent with the fact that some 
weakly perceptual concepts are nonetheless considered to be highly concrete.  For instance, the concepts of month, 
cyanide, bacteria, and brainstem are all extremely concrete (ratings between 4-5 on a 1-5 concreteness scale) and yet 
are simultaneously weakly experienced by all perceptual modalities (ratings between 0-2 on a 0-5 perceptual strength 
scales).  An alternative explanation might be that the abstract/concrete distinction does not rest on the relative extent 
of perceptual grounding, but rather depends on the extent of objectivity: abstract concepts have a subjective existence 
inside the mind whereas concrete concepts have an objective existence that is independent of the mind [e.g., 43, 44]. 
Such a distinction would allow abstract concepts like love, thought, and fashionable to be grounded in perceptual 
experience but still retain their abstractness because their existence is essentially subjective.  Similarly, concrete 
concepts like cyanide, bacteria and brainstem could have little perceptual grounding but yet retain their concreteness 
because of their objective existence.  However, this account is not entirely consistent with how concepts fall on the 
abstract/concrete spectrum.  If month is very concrete because of its objective existence (arguably, a complete lunar 
cycle), then why is year (a complete solar cycle) very abstract?  Similarly, the chemical elements of hydrogen, 
oxygen, and helium are all considered abstract despite their objective existence. 
In summary, although the abstract/concrete distinction has a long history as an ontological framework, its basis is 
unclear.  Certainly, it does not align well with perceptual grounding.  A very large number of concepts that are 
traditionally considered to be abstract are experienced via the senses of vision, hearing, touch, taste, smell, and now 
interoception.  As we show in the present paper, the importance of interoception in particular must not be ignored any 
longer, given its greater contribution to abstract concepts than to concrete and its role as the most important 
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Table 1: Number and percentage of concepts according to their dominant perceptual modality, both overall and within
abstract and concrete subsets.
Category Auditory Gustatory Haptic Interoceptive Olfactory Visual
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Abstract 2945 17.2 96 0.6 183 1.1 2322 13.6 46 0.3 11537 67.4
Concrete 893 5.9 655 4.3 637 4.2 459 3.0 128 0.8 12328 81.6
Overall 3838 11.9 751 2.3 820 2.5 2781 8.6 174 0.5 23865 74.0
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Table 3: Log Bayes Factors (BF) for regression model comparisons of each maximum perceptual strength predictor 
against the null (lexical) model, and for the inclusion of interoception against its exclusion, for standardised response 
times and accuracy in lexical decision and word naming tasks.
Maximum Perceptual 
Strength
Model Lexical Decision Word Naming
RT Acc RT Acc
Five traditional modalities BF10 100.978 36.834 43.335 48.978
Six modalities including 
interoception 
BF20 137.949 58.101 58.194 63.984
Benefit of interoception BF21  36.791 21.267 14.859 15.006
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Figure 1: Distribution of modality-specific perceptual strength ratings for abstract and concrete concepts.  Shaded 
areas represent one standard deviation each side of a central mean line. 
Figure 2: Distribution of modality-specific perceptual strength ratings for emotion concepts and for matched control 
concepts of equivalent abstractness and valence.  Shaded areas represent one standard deviation each side of a central 
mean line.
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Figure 3: Distribution of interoceptive strength ratings for categories of core emotion concepts.  Shaded areas 
represent one standard deviation each side of a central mean line.
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